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Setting the stage
With a new and unpredictable administration taking the reins of power in Washington, the United States’ future relationship with its European allies is unclear.
The European allies are understandably concerned about what the change in the
presidency will mean for the US relationship with NATO and the security guarantees that have been in place for almost 70 years. These concerns are not without
foundation, given some of the statements Trump made about NATO during the
presidential campaign—and his description of NATO on 15 January 2017, just days
before his inauguration, as ‘obsolete’. That comment, made in a joint interview
with The Times of London and the German newspaper Bild, further exacerbated
tensions between the United States and its closest European allies, although Trump
did claim that the alliance is ‘very important to me’.1 The claim that it is obsolete
rested on Trump’s incorrect assumption that the alliance has not been engaged in
the fight against terrorism, a position belied by NATO’s support of the US conflict
in Afghanistan. Among the most striking observations about Trump’s statements
on NATO is that they are contradicted by comments made in confirmation hearings before the Senate by General James N. Mattis (retired), recently confirmed as
Secretary of Defense, who described the alliance as ‘essential for Americans’ security’, and by Rex Tillerson, now the Secretary of State.2
It is important to note that the concerns about the future relationships between
the United States and its NATO allies are not confined to European governments
and policy analysts. In the United States some of the most notable members of
the security establishment have also expressed dismay not only about President
Trump’s policy pronouncements as candidate and as President, but also about
what US policy will be under the new administration. In fact, a letter published
in the Washington Post signed by more than 30 of the most illustrious members of
the US security and foreign policy community, including Madeleine Albright,
1
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Letter available online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/files/2016/08/NATO-statement-Final-080416.pdf (emphasis added).
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, The will to lead: America’s indispensable role in the global fight for freedom (New York:
Broadside, 2016), p. ix.
Nick Waldhem, Joe Carroll and Margaret Talev, ‘Tillerson veers from Trump line as Russia looms over hearing’, Bloomberg News, 11 Jan. 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-01-11/russia-mustbe-held-accountable-for-its-actions-tillerson-says. See also Alexander Lanoszka, ‘Russian hybrid warfare and
extended deterrence in eastern Europe’, International Affairs 92: 1, Jan. 2016, pp. 175–96; Iver B. Neumann,
‘Russia’s Europe, 1991–2016: inferiority to superiority’, International Affairs 92: 6, Nov. 2016, pp. 1381–400; Sten
Rynning, ‘The false promise of continental concert: Russia, the West and the necessary balance of power’,
International Affairs 91: 3, May 2015, pp. 539–52.
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Nicholas Burns and Wesley Clark, states clearly that ‘our security is indivisible with
our democratic allies in Europe’ and takes issue with some of Trump’s campaign statements about the alliance in respect of the doubt they cast on the US commitment
to NATO. The letter also emphasizes that ‘A solemn obligation of the American President is to lead NATO, to remain resolute in defense of our allies and to convince
potential adversaries that we will stand up for NATO without fear or reservation.
Every President, without exception, has accepted the wisdom of this strategy.’3
This is a point echoed by outgoing NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh
Rasmussen, who wrote in the preface to his book published in 2016: ‘The world
needs a policeman. The only capable, reliable and desirable candidate for that
position is the United States. We need determined American global leadership.’4
The question is whether the United States under a Trump administration wants
to take on that role—and is capable of doing so—and whether other countries,
especially the NATO allies, will accept that US leadership again.
During this time of transition and uncertainty, the best way to try to divine
what the relationship will be between the United States and NATO is to look at
the comments made in the confirmation hearings of James Mattis for Secretary
of Defense and Rex Tillerson for Secretary of State, as well as those of candidate
Trump. A particularly telling comment by Tillerson was his remark that ‘our
NATO allies are right to be alarmed at a resurgent Russia’, suggesting that the
alliance remains an important bulwark against Moscow. However, he also noted
that he had not yet had a conversation with Trump about these issues.5 And, in
fact, during their respective confirmation hearings each of the men made statements that were contradictory to those that had been made by Trump as noted
above, further raising concerns about what US security and foreign policy will be.
As we look to the future, it is important to reflect on the evolution of the
relationship between the US and its European allies to date, recognizing that it
has not always been an easy one. In the past, shared values and commitment to
democratic ideals, as well as the collective security nature of the alliance, have held
it together and enabled it to weather these storms; however, given the changed
political landscape of both the United States and Europe, there is no assurance that
this will continue to be the case.
This article takes a historical perspective, exploring the evolution of the transatlantic relationship from the Harmel Report of 1967 up to the present. The focus
is on some of the decisions made by individual US presidents, based on America’s
political and strategic needs at the time that contributed to strains and also recon-
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The US context for the Harmel Report
Fifty years ago, while NATO was undertaking the review that would lead to the
Harmel Report of December 1967, the United States was engaged in a costly and
bitterly divisive war in Vietnam. President Lyndon Johnson was promulgating
his ‘great society’ domestic programmes at the same time as trying to manage a
war in Asia that was seen not only as a fight against communism—this was the
height of the Cold War—but also as a significant test of the United States and its
military abilities. It was a war that the world was watching and that the United
States ultimately lost; or, perhaps more accurately, it was a war that Vietnam won,
prompting real and valid questions about the United States, its military, and some
of its foreign policy decisions.
Although Vietnam was the focus of American politics, both domestic and
foreign, it was a concern for the NATO allies primarily because of the possible
impact it could have on the US commitment to Europe. The noted American
political commentator and journalist Walter Lippman wrote a column in June
1965 following a trip to Europe stating that what he saw there was ‘a spectacular
decline in respect for United States foreign policy’, and that he ‘feared a decline of
solidarity with the NATO partners that might result in their disillusionment with
US leadership of the alliance’.6 Despite the fact that through the Vietnam War
the United States was making clear its determination to fight against communism
anywhere in the world, a hallmark of its Cold War foreign policy, in devoting
attention and resources to this conflict in Asia it risked undermining its ability to
support Europe strategically if needed. Not unlike President Obama’s ‘pivot to the
Pacific’, the US focus on Vietnam prompted concern that Washington’s attention
to Asia was coming at the expense of its promises to Europe.
That said, the NATO allies were not unaware of the linkage between the war
in Vietnam and perceptions of the West in its fight against communism globally.
Not only was NATO aware of the potential threats coming from Asia, but some
of the NATO allies, most notably Canada and the United Kingdom, supported
the United States in its struggle against communism. Two other NATO members,
6
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ciliation between the United States and its European allies. That history should
provide insight into the current relationship and some answers to the questions
that are currently being raised about NATO, its relevance and the role of the
United States in the alliance. Just as the Harmel Report, 50 years ago, was precipitated in part by the approaching 20th anniversary of the alliance in 1969, perhaps
the questions that are being raised now by President Trump and members of his
administration will prompt some additional re-evaluation that can strengthen the
institution, or, at the very least, prompt a reaffirmation of its relevance in the light
of a resurgent Russia. The other possibility is that they will continue to undermine an alliance at a delicate point in its existence.

Quoted in Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the UN: a peculiar relationship (Columbia: University of Missouri
Press, 2010), p. 79.
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The Harmel Report and US–NATO policy
The context in which the Harmel Report was produced is of crucial importance.
As noted above, the United States was preoccupied during the period immediately
preceding and following the adoption of this important NATO document. In
1969, Lyndon Johnson was replaced as president by Richard Nixon, who not only
approached the war in Vietnam differently, but had a very different strategic vision
for the United States. Nixon’s approach to foreign and strategic policy, encouraged and supported by his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, was to engage in
a policy of detente with the two major communist countries, the Soviet Union
and China. In pursuit of this intended reordering of the international system,
Nixon had to extend his focus beyond Europe, although NATO was part of his
political agenda early in his tenure. In fact, it can be argued that Nixon’s strategic
7
8
9
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Greece and Portugal, identified their own fights against communist forces as similar
to the US experience in Vietnam. Notwithstanding those expressions of support,
however, NATO Secretary-General Manlio Brosio, addressing the NATO parliamentary conference in Brussels in 1965, warned that ‘a setback of the United States
in Asia, for example, in Vietnam, would also be a grave setback for the whole
of the West’.7 And the German delegate and member of the Bundestag Helmut
Schmidt voiced the doubts that many Europeans already had about the United
States when he warned that ‘America’s historic orientation toward the Pacific
arena would drain the Atlantic alliance of its vitality as well as of US troops’.8
It is well known that divisions existed within the alliance at the time of the
Harmel Report; the 1966 decision by French President Charles de Gaulle to
withdraw from the integrated military command certainly stands as one example
of a lack of common vision and understanding at that time. Further exacerbating
the concerns was the possibility that NATO could cease to exist under the terms
of Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which stated that: ‘After the Treaty has
been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after
its notice of denunciation has been given.’9 The twenty-year mark in 1969 was
rapidly approaching.
It was these fears and the divisions within the alliance that set the context for
the Harmel Report of December 1967, which identified two main tasks for the
alliance: ‘to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter
aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member
countries if aggression should occur’; and ‘to pursue the search for progress
towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political problems can
be solved’.10

Quoted in Kaplan, NATO and the UN, p. 82.
Quoted in Kaplan, NATO and the UN, p. 83.
The North Atlantic Treaty (Treaty of Washington), Washington DC, 4 April 1949, in NATO Handbook Documentation (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999), p. 39.
The future tasks of the alliance (Harmel Report), Brussels, 13–14 Dec. 1967, in NATO Handbook Documentation, p.
195.
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Richard Nixon, ‘Statement on the forthcoming visit to western Europe’, 6 Feb. 1969, http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2219.
Quoted in Chris Barber, ‘Why Europe was President Nixon’s first foreign trip’, 5 March 2014, http://nixonfoundationblog.org/europe-president-richard-nixon/.
‘Address by President Nixon to the North Atlantic Council’, Washington DC, 10 April 1969, https://history.
state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d18.
See Tiffany Thompson, ‘President Nixon’s vision of NATO’, 2 Nov. 2016, https://www.nixonfoundation.
org/2016/11/president-nixons-vision-nato/.
See Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.
See Luke A. Nichter, Richard Nixon and Europe: the reshaping of the postwar Atlantic world (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2015), p. 14.
Nichter, Richard Nixon and Europe, p. 16.
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vision would not have been possible without a strong and stable Atlantic alliance;
shoring that up and providing a broader rationale for its existence were among
the early items on Nixon’s foreign policy agenda.
Nixon’s first tour outside the United States as president took him to western
Europe in February 1969, including a visit to NATO headquarters. In a statement before embarking on the journey, Nixon said: ‘The purpose of this trip
is to underline my commitment to the closest relationship between our friends
in Western Europe and the United States. I would like to lift these relationships from a concern for tactical problems of the day to a definition of common
purpose.’ Regarding NATO specifically, he went on to assert that ‘the Alliance,
held together in its first two decades by a common fear, needs now the sense of
cohesiveness supplied by common purpose’.11
The importance of NATO and the US relationship with the countries of
western Europe was further underscored in an address given by Kissinger, in
which he said: ‘The President believes that our relations with Western Europe
are of overriding importance—because they are the oldest and closest allies and
also because a stable world is inconceivable without a European contribution.’12
In fact, according to documents mined from the Nixon Foundation, the trip to
Europe was an important part of Nixon’s (and Kissinger’s) pursuit of the administration’s strategic vision and larger foreign policy goals. Shortly after returning
from that trip, at the 20th anniversary meeting of NATO in Washington DC,
Nixon asked for the creation of ‘a committee on the challenges of modern society
... to explore ways in which the experience and resources of the Western nations
could most effectively be marshaled toward improving the quality of life of our
peoples’ and to help twentieth-century man to learn ‘how to remain in harmony
with his rapidly-changing world’.13 The subsequent creation of the Committee on
the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) was designed, in conjunction with the
Harmel Report, to ensure NATO’s relevance in a changing world, at least from
the US perspective.14
In many ways, the underlying goals of the CCMS stressed the importance of
Article 2 of the NATO Treaty with its emphasis on cooperation and friendly
political and economic relations,15 and the belief that the strength of the alliance
depended as much on the vitality of the individual member states as on their
military strength.16 According to Nichter, the CCMS ‘marked a formal entrance
of the alliance into the area of détente’.17 More important, perhaps, is that Nixon
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Patterns
The 30-year period from Nixon to the Bush era was not always an easy one for the
US relationship with other NATO members. The four years of the Carter administration (1977–81) were characterized by a series of blunders that further divided
the United States from its allies. The ill-conceived enhanced radiation warhead
(ERW) decision, coupled with Helmut Schmidt’s lecture to the International Institute of Strategic Studies in October 1977,21 called into question the United States’
commitment to NATO, fostering a renewed feeling of estrangement on both sides
of the Atlantic. Carter was followed by eight years of Ronald Reagan during
which the Cold War was approaching its end. The excellent relationships Reagan
had with his fellow conservative heads of government, Margaret Thatcher in
18

19
20
21

For more detail about the end of Bretton Woods and the restructuring of US economic and monetary policy
and the impact of this change on the allies, see Nichter, ch. 2, ‘Closing the gold window’, in Richard Nixon
and Europe, pp. 36–67,
Nichter, Richard Nixon and Europe, p. 88.
Nichter, Richard Nixon and Europe, p. 218.
The full text of the Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture given on 28 Oct. 1977 by Helmut Schmidt, then
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, can be found in Survival 20: 1, Jan.–Feb. 1978, pp. 2–10, and
online at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Euromissiles_Reader_PartI_SectionA.pdf.
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used his European trip and subsequent call for the creation of the CCMS to stress
the need for the allies to bear a greater share of the common defence burden,
a point that has been repeatedly raised subsequently, most recently by Trump.
Furthermore, the idea was established that NATO is not only a collective security
agreement but also a relationship with the potential to bind like-minded countries
together in any number of ways for their mutual benefit.
Many of Nixon’s policies outraged and further estranged the other members
of NATO. An example of this is Nixon’s decision in 1971 to implement a radical change in US monetary policy that resulted in the end of the Bretton Woods
economic system that had been in place since the end of the Second World War, a
decision that was made without adequate consultation with the European nations.18
In effect, ‘they were supposed to be American allies, but they were not being
treated like allies’.19 As Nixon’s larger strategic vision was being implemented, the
US relationship with Europe was eclipsed by other priorities. While the Nixon
administration did attempt to repair some of the fractures it had created, these
moves were greeted sceptically by European leaders who had seen this attempted
before. Simultaneously, political changes in European countries, coupled with
the movement towards enlargement of what was then the European Economic
Community, shifted attention away from the United States. ‘Over time, Europeans
became frustrated with their diminished place in American foreign policy’;20 and
this was a concern that the Nixon administration did little to address. This is further
evidence of the emergence of a dual pattern whereby the United States pursued
policies deemed to be in its own national interest, often at the expense of Europe,
while at the same time the European countries were developing their own policies,
both individually and collectively, that minimized or excluded the United States.
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The only NATO country to support the United States in this enterprise was Britain; other European countries
refused US permission to use bases in their countries and to overfly their territory in the course of the bombing raids.
‘The Alliance’s Strategic Concept’, in NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press,
1995), p. 237.
See e.g. James M. Goldgeier, Not whether but when: the US decision to enlarge NATO (Washington DC: Brookings
Institution, 1999).
For further discussion about the different approaches to the use of ground forces in Kosovo, see Joyce P. Kaufman, ‘War in Kosovo and its aftermath, 1999’, in NATO and the former Yugoslavia: crisis, conflict and the Atlantic
alliance (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), ch. 6, pp. 171–208.
Sten Rynning, NATO renewed: the power and purpose of transatlantic cooperation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2005), pp. 29–30.
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Britain and Helmut Kohl in Germany, helped strengthen US–European relations
during this period. Nonetheless, there were also critical areas of disagreement.
Britain’s attack on the Falklands in 1982 was carried through over the objections of
the allies, as was Reagan’s announcement of the possible creation of the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983 and the US bombing of Libya in 1986.22 SDI was
especially important in reinvigorating the Western European Union (WEU) at
a time when its activities had lost momentum—another indicator of growing
European independence vis-à-vis the United States.
As a collective security alliance, NATO took the initiative in starting to address
the changing geostrategic and political environment following the end of the
Cold War, arriving at a Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance
(the London Declaration) in 1990, and in the following year producing the Rome
Declaration which affirmed the key role of NATO even in a changing world and a
new Strategic Concept for the alliance for the future; both of these reaffirmed the
fundamental principles of the alliance while also seeking to adapt the alliance to
changing global realities. The Strategic Concept was especially prescient in identifying possible risks to the alliance likely to result ‘from the serious economic,
social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes
which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe’.23
In fact, as Yugoslavia disintegrated into brutal ethnic conflict, serious differences arose about how to address that situation while NATO was also dealing
with President Clinton’s call for enlargement in 1994.24 The subsequent war
in Kosovo in 1999 and the disagreement about the use of ground forces there,
something to which Clinton was adamantly opposed, caused further division.25
As the alliance was dealing with the aftermath of the wars in former Yugoslavia
and the events leading up to the Kosovo conflict, at a ministerial meeting in Berlin
in 1996 it developed a framework for cooperation with the EU that would evolve
into ‘Berlin Plus’ in 2002. This grew from the 1990 London Declaration and the
belief that ‘the development of a European identity in the domain of security
will strengthen Alliance solidarity’.26 Later in 1996 this was accompanied by the
emergence of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) which, in effect,
allowed for the creation of European-led security coalitions. These depended
heavily on the resuscitated WEU, although, as Rynning notes, ‘this [compromise]
was sufficiently ambiguous to let some actors (i.e. the United States) claim that
NATO was now established as the bedrock of Europe’s security architecture and
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9/11 and its aftermath
While the George W. Bush administration initially came into office with a call
for a neo-unilateralist, almost isolationist foreign policy, the attacks of 9/11
forged a new direction for US foreign policy; once again the United States was
actively involved internationally with a ‘you are either with us or against us’
brand of foreign policy. When Bush pursued policies that he felt were in the
best interest of the United States, including the decision to go into Iraq and to
pursue Saddam Hussein in March 2003 without UN approval, his actions created
rifts with NATO allies and also shifted world opinion against the United States.
While few contested the wisdom of, or justification for, the war with Afghanistan,
alleged to be harbouring Al-Qaeda and specifically the individuals behind the 9/11
attacks, many saw the war with Iraq as an unnecessary diversion. That decision
remains controversial today.29 And it can be argued that the United States has yet
to rebuild the relationships with its allies that were fractured by the Bush decision
to invade Iraq.
The events of 9/11 significantly altered the priorities of the Bush administration, creating the ‘global war on terror’ and making this the United States’ highest
foreign policy priority. From that time forward, all aspects of the Bush administration’s foreign and security policy stemmed from, and were justified by, the
need to support the ‘war on terror’. It is therefore instructive to review an article
written by Condoleezza Rice in 2000, prior to the presidential election, and to
note the attention she paid there to the US national interest, which she defined
‘by a desire to foster the spread of freedom, prosperity and peace’.30 It was that
27
28
29

30

Rynning, NATO renewed, p. 30.
Rynning, NATO renewed, p. 38.
This decision has been examined from a number of political and policy perspectives in a plethora of books,
many of which came out during or shortly after the end of the Bush administration. Among them are Thomas
Ricks, Fiasco: the American military adventure in Iraq, 2003–2005 (New York: Penguin, 2006); Todd S. Purdum,
A time of our choosing: America’s war in Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2003); Michael R. Gordon and General
Bernard E. Trainor, The endgame: the inside story of the struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama (New
York: Vintage, 2012). All three of these rely on interviews and documents to tell the story of the war with
Iraq and how it evolved. See also Carlotta Gall, The wrong enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001–2014 (New York:
Mariner, 2014), which addresses the impact of the US invasion on Afghanistan and its people; Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial life in the Emerald City: inside Iraq’s Green Zone (New York: Vintage, 2006), which looks at
Iraq in the immediate aftermath of the US invasion in 2003.
Condoleezza Rice, ‘Promoting the national interest’, Foreign Affairs 79: 1, Jan.–Feb. 2000, p. 62.
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others (i.e. France) that the European option was on track to grow increasingly
autonomous’.27 NATO would have to make some changes or ‘reforms’ in order
to ensure the viability of this evolving relationship, which it did at the same time
as dealing with enlargement issues. One result was that NATO members were
put into a position where ‘they needed to clarify their choice of design for future
cooperation’.28 Or, to put it another way, these changes, including a resurgent
European security arrangement, required NATO to address its role in a changing
world coupled with an internal power struggle about the leadership and direction
of the alliance.
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desire to spread freedom and democracy that ultimately was used to justify the
US decision for war in Iraq, eclipsing the initial rationale for the attack, which
was ‘regime change’ and the desire to eliminate the spread of weapons of mass
destruction allegedly possessed by Iraq.
It is also important to note that the decision to go into Iraq was not without
dissenters even within the administration. Secretary of State Colin Powell, who
had been the military director of the first Gulf War, warned of the possible dangers
of such a mission, and was quoted as warning the President at a meeting in August
2002 that ‘We’d own a country.’31 Nonetheless, the decision was made that the
campaign in Iraq was to be a priority.
Despite his suspicion of international organizations such as the UN, Bush was
persuaded of the necessity of going to that organization to seek international
legitimation of his decision. In a speech before the General Assembly in September
2002, Bush made it clear that unless Iraq complied with the UN Security Council
resolutions demanding that weapons inspectors be allowed back into the country,
action would be taken, and he left no doubt that the United States would go
it alone if necessary. But Germany, a major NATO ally, was already voicing
opposition to any war in Iraq, as was France, another ally. Six months before the
war with Iraq, then, disagreements as to the next steps to be taken were already
brewing between the United States and some of its closest European allies. Only
Britain was showing complete support for Washington.
Bush took the opportunity of the State of the Union message in January 2003
to make the implicit case for war, claiming that Saddam had systematically violated
the agreement to dismantle all weapons of mass destruction.32 Then in February,
despite his own reservations, Powell went to the UN to make the case against
Saddam Hussein there and to persuade other countries of the need for military
action. Although UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that without the
support of the Security Council the legitimacy of any such action would be questioned, on 19 March 2003 President Bush announced that ‘at this hour American
and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq,
to free its people, and to defend the world from grave danger’.33 The result was
a significant schism between the United States and its allies, which proved to be
especially damaging at a time when the United States was building support for, and
needed to sustain allied commitment to, the continuing conflict in Afghanistan.
A 2016 biography of President Bush concludes as follows: ‘Whether George
W. Bush was the worst president in American history will be long debated, but
his decision to invade Iraq is easily the worst foreign policy decision ever made by
an American President.’34 Analysts may argue about that judgement. However,
what is undeniable is the damage that decision did to the United States’ prestige,
Purdum, A time of our choosing, pp. 41–2.
George W. Bush, ‘State of the Union Address’, 28 Jan. 2003, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
onpolitics/transcripts/bushtext_012803.html.
‘President Bush’s address on the Iraqi invasion’, 19 March 2003, http://blogs.wsj.com/dispatch/2013/03/18/
full-text-of-president-george-w-bushs-speech-march-19-2003/.
Jean Edward Smith, Bush (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016), p. 660.
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its economy and its relationship with its allies. In retrospect, it is possible to ask
whether the severe differences that have emerged between the United States and
some of its allies in recent years were solely the result of the Iraq War, or whether
that war simply provided the occasion for deep-seated differences to be brought
to the surface once again.

After the divisiveness of the Bush years, which seriously disturbed the alliance, the
candidacy of Barack Obama was enough to begin to restore a sense of hopefulness,
although foreign policy was quickly eclipsed by the global economic crisis which
hit just a few months prior to his election. Rightly or not, the United States was
blamed for the economic downturn that affected not only it, but most of the
rest of the world. In fact, a 2008 Pew poll found that ‘the US image is suffering
almost everywhere’, at least in part because ‘in the most economically developed
countries, people blame America for the financial crisis’.35 Thus, the emphasis
of the presidential campaign quickly shifted to economics, although Obama also
made it clear that, if elected president, among his first priorities would be foreign
policy: specifically, ending the war in Iraq, giving renewed attention to the war in
Afghanistan, closing the prison camp at Guantánamo Bay and, in general, working
to restore the United States’ position in the world.
In his first inaugural address as president, on 20 January 2009, Obama set out his
foreign policy stance with clarity and emphasis: ‘Know that America is a friend
of each nation and every man, woman, and child who seeks a future of peace and
dignity, and that we are ready to lead once more.’36 Philip Gordon notes that simply
‘having a new face in the White House will itself do much to restore many allies’
disinclination to work closely with the United States’.37 While that was true initially,
the onus was on the Obama administration to show that it could follow through
on its campaign promises and that the United States could lead once more. This has
not proved to be an easy task. Within his first year in office, Obama outlined how
he proposed to deal with the continuing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, criticizing the lack of attention to Iraq and announcing the ‘surge’ in troops to redress it.
During the remainder of his tenure in office, Obama worked hard to re-establish
the pre-eminent role that the United States had played globally. He gave speeches
in Ankara in April 2009 and in Cairo in June 2009, both specifically reaching out to
the Muslim world to try to mend the ties frayed by the years of the Bush administration. In both of these he stressed an important theme: ‘America is not—and
never will be—at war with Islam.’38 The Ankara speech was especially important;
35
36
37
38
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Turkey is a NATO member with a strategic location geographically, and this speech
was important in shoring up relations between the two allies.
The relationship between the United States and its European allies—the
closest relationship that the United States has—were strained severely by the US
decision to go to war with Iraq in 2003, as noted above. In an effort to restore those
ties Obama met many European leaders, either individually or in the course of
summit meetings, and he came into office wildly popular in Europe. Nonetheless,
the lesson the President learned is that Europe as a whole is no longer willing to
go along with whatever the United States wants or wherever the United States
leads. It has become clear that ‘Europe’ is made up of independent countries as
well as being a single bloc, and that there are differences among them, and with
the United States, that are not easily bridged.39
Relations between the United States and its European allies were further
strained relatively early in Obama’s second term when information was leaked
that the US National Security Agency had been collecting phone and data records
of millions of Americans and had also bugged EU offices; this drew criticism
from European leaders and cast a pall over Obama’s trip to Berlin following the
G8 summit in June 2013. Pressed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Obama
said that ‘terrorist threats in her country [Germany] were among those foiled by
such intelligence operations worldwide—a contention that Ms Merkel seemed to
confirm’.40 At a news conference held with the two leaders, Merkel said that ‘she
and Mr Obama had discussed the surveillance issue at length, indicating that it
took precedence over subjects like the global economy and conflicts in Syria and
Afghanistan’.41 This latest issue in many ways overshadowed what the administration hoped would be America’s successful re-emergence on the world stage under
Obama and his rapprochement with the European allies.
Further questions about the US commitment to Europe were raised as a result
of Obama’s stated ‘pivot to the Pacific’, a policy shift designed to help counter the
growing power of China, especially in the South and East China Seas. This policy
decision emerged from findings documented in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
Report, which notes: ‘The United States and China’s Asian neighbors remain
concerned about China’s current modernization efforts, including its qualitative and quantitative modernization of its nuclear arsenal.’ Moreover, ‘the lack
of transparency surrounding its nuclear programmes—their pace and scope, as
well as the strategy and doctrine that guide them—raises questions about China’s
future intentions.’42 It is this uncertainty that is so problematic for the United

261
International Affairs 93: 2, 2017

INTA93_2_FullIssue.indb 261

16/02/2017 13:35:09

Joyce P. Kaufman

43

44
45
46
47

of Great Power relations”: a G2 with Chinese characteristics?’, pp. 773–94; Wu Xinbo, ‘Cooperation, competition and shaping the outlook: the United States and China’s neighbourhood diplomacy’, pp. 849–68.
Leo G. Michel and James J. Przystup, The US ‘rebalance’ and Europe: convergent strategies open doors to improved
cooperation, Strategic Perspectives no. 16 (Washington DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National
Defense University Press, June 2014), p. 3.
Michel and Przystup, The US ‘rebalance’ and Europe, p. 3.
Michel and Przystup, The US ‘rebalance’ and Europe, p. 6.
See Michel and Przystup, The US ‘rebalance’ and Europe, p. 7.
Paul Cornish and Andrew M. Dorman, ‘Complex security and strategic latency: the UK Strategic Defence
and Security Review 2015’, International Affairs 91: 2, March 2015, pp. 351–70.

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/93/2/251/2996077 by Whittier College user on 23 October 2020

States, and also for other states in the region (many of them US allies) that wonder
about China’s intentions and US commitment. As was the case decades earlier in
the Vietnam War, however, this shift in policy raised concerns among some of the
European allies about a potential diversion of US attention from Europe, as well
as about overstretch of US military forces in the light of the continuing conflicts
in the Middle East.
As noted in a piece published by the Institute for National Strategic Studies in
2014, which reflected the US interpretation of European reactions to the ‘pivot’,
among the greatest concerns of the European allies was that the announced deployments of additional US troops to Asia ‘might heighten the risks of a military
confrontation involving China, its neighbours, and the United States’. However,
as the authors also noted, some of the European reactions can be attributed to
‘insufficient efforts by US officials to consult with their European counterparts in
advance of the public rollout of the new strategy’. 43 So, according to this analysis,
rather than reacting to the policy shift itself, European policy-makers were
reacting to the way in which the shift was announced, which they equated with
a ‘dismissive’ US attitude: not the first time such a cycle of action and reaction
has occurred. Since then, however, European leaders have been reassured by both
public and private declarations by senior US officials ‘of the enduring American
commitment to European security’.44 Further, the United States’ forceful stand
against Russian actions in Crimea and Ukraine in 2014 and 2015 also reassured its
NATO allies, at least temporarily.
That said, one of the unintended consequences of the recent US actions regarding Asia has been to encourage Europeans to rethink their own strategy and policies
towards that region, including expanding trade ties. This can be seen in changing
policies on the part of the EU as a whole and by individual states. For example,
under Angela Merkel’s leadership Germany has forged a ‘strategic relationship’ with
China, to include high-level government contact on a range of issues. France too
has pursued ‘broader and deeper trade, investment, and diplomatic relations with
Asia–Pacific nations ...’, thereby building on a pattern that it has had in the region
for decades.45 Following his election in May 2012, France’s President Hollande
appointed two Asian specialists to key positions in his staff, another indicator of
France’s changing focus.46 Since then, France has increased its trade relationship
with China, which it, like Germany, sees as a strategic partnership.
The shift in US policy has also caused the United Kingdom to take a fresh look
at its own relationship with Asia in the twenty-first century.47 Britain already had
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Trump and the prospects for US–NATO relations
In July 2016, the night before he was to accept his party’s nomination for the
presidency, Donald Trump was asked in an interview about his commitment to
NATO and to defending the NATO allies if they were attacked. His response
shocked and startled the allies. Trump said that ‘if Russia attacked them [the Baltic
states] he would decide whether to come to their aid only after reviewing if those
nations have “fulfilled their obligations to us”’. According to coverage by the New
York Times, this statement ‘appeared to be the first time that a major candidate for
president had suggested conditioning the United States’ defense of its major allies’.
It should also be noted that this statement ‘was consistent ... with his previous
threat to withdraw American forces from Europe and Asia if those allies fail[ed]
to pay more for American protection’.49 During the 45-minute interview, Trump
described how he ‘would force allies to shoulder defence costs that the United
States has borne for decades, cancel longstanding treaties he views as unfavorable,
and redefine what it means to be a partner of the United States’.50 As might be
expected, these comments raised concern not only among the European allies
of the United States, but in all countries with which the United States has had a
48
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strong ties to the region through its Commonwealth relationships with Australia,
Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore, with which it established the Five Power
Defence Arrangement in 1971. For some other European countries, however, the
US decision has provided additional reasons to focus on European security needs,
both with and without the United States.
Daniel Twinning of the German Marshall Fund of the United States offered
a slightly different perspective in a 2015 article. While he acknowledged that
individual European nations pursued their own policies regarding Asia, he
advocated that the EU develop a common comprehensive policy for engagement
with Asia.48 He suggested that this would be a stronger policy and would be less
likely to result in the splintering of alliances, such as NATO or the EU, in the
face of a resurgent China. His concern—and it appears to be a valid one—is that
competition for trade with China could serve as a wedge among the European
nations at a time when they need to work together. We can put his argument
another way by suggesting that the US pivot to Asia could have the effect of
forcing the European allies to pursue their own individual interests at the expense
of the common interest of the whole. Rather than enhancing security in Asia—
the alleged goal of the US policy shift—the result would be to undermine US
security ties to Europe as the European countries, individually and/or collectively,
formulate their respective policies regarding Asia.

See Daniel Twining, ‘Europe’s incomplete pivot to Asia’, Asian Institute for Policy Studies, The Asan Forum,
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security relationship. In many ways, those comments struck hardest at the NATO
allies, which were already concerned about the extent of US commitments,
especially in the face of a resurgent Russia. Trump’s support of Russia’s President
Putin and his unwillingness to recognize the aggressive nature of Russia’s actions
in Ukraine and Crimea seemed to be directed especially at the Baltic states of
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, all NATO members.51
The unconventional nature of Trump’s campaign, his unlikely election as president, and his apparent reordering of US security and foreign policy priorities have
combined to undermine other nations’ confidence in the United States as a world
leader at a time of increasing global uncertainty, even instability. What made his
ascent to the presidency of the United States and the leadership of a major military
and economic power particularly unlikely has been Trump’s apparent disregard for
precedent and for the priorities that have largely managed to keep peace internationally since the end of the Second World War. As noted above, there have been
strains in the Atlantic alliance before, some major, some less so. However, the
strength and common purposes of NATO have been great enough to overcome
those and to keep the alliance united for the greater good. The comments made
by Trump during the campaign and since his election have been enough to cause
concern about whether NATO can withstand this latest attack from its major
partner and putative leader.
For clues about what might happen we may usefully turn to Trump’s choice for
Secretary of Defense: Marine General James N. Mattis (retired), who had served
as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation from 2007 to 2009.
While Mattis has indeed spoken of the need for all NATO members to spend at
least 2 per cent of their GDP on defence, long a NATO goal, he is perceived as
someone who supports the goals and role of the alliance. During his tenure at
NATO his main focus was on improving the military readiness of the allies. He is
also perceived to be a serious strategic thinker as well as an influential military leader
who is not likely to change US military policy quickly or without careful study.
That has provided some reassurance, both within the United States and beyond.
Furthermore, there are already indicators that General Mattis and President
Trump do not agree on a range of issues, and the hope is that Mattis can be a necessary counterweight to ensure the stability of the alliance with US commitment as
an anchor. While Mattis favours a tougher stance towards US adversaries, such as
Iran, which he has called ‘the single most enduring threat to stability and peace in
the Middle East’, he has also argued that, despite the weaknesses of the Iran nuclear
deal, ‘he did not see a way that Washington could go back on it, because any
unilateral sanctions issued by the United States would not be as valuable if allies
were not on board’.52 Early indicators are that, unlike President Trump, Secretary
David S. Yost, ‘The Budapest Memorandum and Russia’s intervention in Ukraine’, International Affairs 91: 3,
May 2015, pp. 505–38.
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Conclusion
There are important lessons to be learned from the United States’ relationship
with its European allies, and the interaction between and among them. The first
is that the individual who holds the office of president does have a direct impact
on other countries’ perceptions of the United States. We can see this clearly with
the change in attitudes towards the United States from the Bush presidency to that
of Obama and now Trump. Second, even though many, both within the United
States and abroad, disagreed with some of the Obama administration’s policies,
other countries regained confidence in the United States and in that President
to lead. That perception generated important goodwill on the part of US allies.
And third, as Obama leaves office, while there is still a belief in the importance of
the relationships—political, military, economic—between the United States and
the countries of Europe, those relationships are once again under threat. Where
candidate Hillary Clinton spoke of the importance of such relationships, candidate Trump disparaged them, thereby sowing seeds of mistrust that have been
reinforced by early statements made by the incoming President.
The European allies have their own issues to deal with, not least how to respond
to the result of the ‘Brexit’ vote in June 2016 and the British decision to leave
the European Union. Although it might appear that this has little to do with the
United States, the reality is that the United States is tied to the EU as an economic
bloc—the largest trading partner that the United States has. Also, the departure
of Britain from the EU raises questions about European security and what this
might mean for NATO. During the presidential election campaign Trump raised
questions about the relevance of NATO in the wake of the Cold War, claiming
that the United States is bearing too much of the burden for Europe’s security. In
contrast, Clinton talked about the importance of NATO, especially in the face of a
resurgent Russia. This difference in approach also reflects the divergence between
53
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of Defense Mattis understands the larger strategic issues, including the necessity
of working multilaterally as a key aspect of US security policy. Similarly, the
statements of Rex Tillerson during his confirmation hearings as Secretary of State
provide more clues to the future behaviour and policies of the country; and he
too seemed to offer positions that contradicted those put forward by Trump. For
example, in his opening remarks to the Senate Tillerson affirmed the necessity of
US leadership globally, while Trump ‘has cast the US as overextended and in need
of an “America first” policy’53—a theme that the new President stressed forcefully in his inaugural address on 20 January.54 Tillerson comes into the position of
Secretary of State never having served in the government and, holding the post at
the pleasure of the President, will ultimately be responsible for implementing the
Trump administration’s policies.
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the two candidates about Russia in general, with Trump talking about Putin in
complimentary terms and hinting that the United States and Russia could (and
should) work together to address the crisis in Syria and elsewhere, while Clinton
called Putin a ‘bully’. This example of the difference in perspective between
the two candidates illustrates why the rest of the world watches US elections,
especially presidential ones, so closely.
There is little doubt that NATO faces challenges ahead, some pertaining to
how the alliance will deal with the uncertainties of a Trump administration and
some deriving from the unpredictable nature of the domestic policies of other
allies. The Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump have given momentum
to nationalist leaders in Europe who see upcoming elections in the Netherlands,
France and Germany as creating new opportunities for their own political gain.
Turkey has moved closer to Russia, joining that country and Iran for peace talks in
Moscow and Kazakhstan hoping to end the war in Syria. Turkey has been working
directly with Russia in part in retaliation for US willingness to work with Kurdish
forces on the ground in opposition to the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.
This poses any number of dangers to NATO and to regional stability, and also
has implications for the changing power dynamic vis-à-vis Russia, none of which
bodes well for the United States. In January 2017, the United States started to
deploy troops to the Baltic states, Poland and Romania, a move authorized by
the outgoing Obama administration and designed to send a signal of deterrence
to Russia in the wake of its aggression against Ukraine and its seizure of Crimea,
as well as one of reassurance to NATO. What President Trump will do about this
deployment remains unclear.
In his recent book, Anders Fogh Rasmussen writes of the need for continued
US leadership in a world that has become increasingly dangerous. He also reminds
us of the divisions that exist within Europe, between ‘those forces who favor
an alliance with America and those who want to create a geopolitical alternative to the United States’.55 In many ways, those differences have become more
pronounced in Europe since the election of Donald Trump, just as his election has
divided many in the United States. But that makes it even more important that the
United States does not abrogate its leadership role.
While the eyes of the world are on the United States and its new, unpredictable and untested President, it is also important to remember that the alliance has
weathered crises and divisions before, and has survived and continued to operate
because of its ability to adapt to changing realities. The role that NATO plays
transcends its security function which, while clearly important, itself enables the
economic growth and political stability of the member nations to flourish. In
short, the goals of the NATO Treaty of almost 70 years ago and the Harmel
Report of 50 years ago remain important and as relevant today as they were then.
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